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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
it", statutes have deprived parents, without the parents' consent, of
a child under certain circumstances 12. Hence, in the past, emphasis has
been placed upon the individual interests of the parents and the in-
terests of the child.
The circuit court of appeals found that the District of Columbia
Code'13 adopted a new and different public policy toward adoption, i.e.,
a change in emphasis from the parental interests to the social interests
involved' 4---weight being given to the interests of the child in both
cases. Thus, "The individual interests of parents which used to be
the thing chiefly regarded has come to be almost the last thing re-
garded as compared with the interest of society and of the child."'15
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Original Package Doctrine
A manufacturer contracted to purchase raw materials from foreign
and Filipino suppliers through the latter's American agents. The
merchandise was identified with and appropriated to the purchase
contract from the moment of shipment., The merchandise was con-
signed to brokers and bankers, part on order, part on straight bills
of lading, with instructions to notify the manufacturer; 2 it was cleared
through customs in the consignee's name and then reconsigned to the
manufacturer. While stored in original packages in a warehouse at
the purchaser's factory pending use in the manufacturing process,
11. James v. Williams, 169 Tenn. 41, 82 S.W. (2d) 541 (1935); In re
Clough, 28 Ariz. 204, 236 Pac. 700 (1925).
12. Abandonment. Adoption of McGill, 49 Pa. D.&C. 374 (1943); Peti-
tion of Elkendahl, 321 Ill. App. 457, 53 N.E. (2d) 302 (1943);
Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907). Drunk-
enness. Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349 (1903).
13. D.C. Code, (1940) tit. 16, c.II, §§16-201 to 16-207.
14. In its reasoning as to the legislative policy the court stated,
"(***It goes without saying that such people (illegitimate) are
more apt to become a burden upon organized society than cooperat-
ing members of it.' Mangold, "Children Born out of Wedlock" (1921)
131." p. 651 n. "'The number of children who are housed in asy-
lums or boarded out at the expense of the public is evidence enough
of the problem and of the need.' Information supplied by the Board
of Public Welfare of the District of Columbia." p. 650. "It was
with all these considerations in mind that congress repealed the old
statute and enacted a new one for the District of Columbia***."
6. 650.
15. Pound, "The Spirit of the Common Law' (1921) 189.
1. Ground given in distinguishing Waring v. City of Mobile, 8 Wall.
122 (U.S. 1868) (consignee held to be the importer). See prin-
cipal case at 876 n. 4.
2. 46 Stat. 721 (1930), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1483 (1) (1934) provides that
merchandise imported into the United States "shall be held to be the
property of the person to whom the same is consigned." The
court did "not deem this provision to be significant." Principal
case, at 876 n. 3. " . . . the Constitution gives Congress au-
thority . . . to lay down its own test for determining when the
immunity ends." Id. at 878. The Board of Tax Appeals considered
the provision. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 26 Ohio 0. 25 (1943).
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the goods were assessed for a nondiscriminatory state ad valorem
property tax. The levy was protested under U.S. Const. Art. 1,
§ 10, cl. 2. State Board of Tax Appeals denied review.3  State Su-
preme Court affirmed.4 Certiorari granted. Held: Imports5 for man-
ufacture are constitutionally immune from state taxation when "held
by the importerG in the original packages and before they are sub-
jected to the manufacture for which they were imported. '7 Dissent:
Imports for use of the importer are not constitutionaly exempt from
state taxation "after they have reached the end of their import jour-
ney."s HOOVEN & ALLISON CO. v. EVATT, Tax Commr., 65 Sup.
Ct. 870 (1945).
3. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, Board of Tax Appeals 26 Ohio
0. 25 (1943).
4. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 142 Ohio St. 2';5, 51 N.E. (2d)
723 (1943) (decision on theory that sale occurred after imports
arrived or, that at least goods were so incorporated with mass
of property of state as to destroy immunity) relying on Waring
v. City of Mobile, 8 Wall. 122 (U.S. 1868).
5. "Imports are articles brought into the United States from without
the country," i.e. a place not "organized by and under the Con-
stitution." Principal case at 879, 880, 881. Ihe definition of
"country" is an application of the doctrines o2 "incorporation"
developed by Justice White in Downs v. BidwEll, 182 U.S. 244(1900) to rationalize exceptions in the Insular Cases. See Bur-
gess, "The Decisions in the Insular Cases" (1901) 16 Pol. Sci. Q.
486; Coudert, "The Evolution of the Doctrine cf Territorial In-
corporation" (1926) 40 Am. L. School Rev. 801; Swisher, "American
Constitutional Development" (1943) 474-482. Under this defini-
tion, articles brought from the Philippines were- held to be im-
ports. But see Justice Reed, principal case at 886, defining an
import as "an article brought from beyond the sovereignty orjurisdiction of the United States." Query: Is it logically defen-
sible to say that there may be an import from a country to which
there cannot be an export? Cf. Dooley v. United States, 182
U.S. 222, 234 (1901).
6. An importer is the person who "is the efficient cause of the
importation." Principal case at 876. Under thi3 definition, "the
time when the title passes . . . is immaterial." Ibid. Similarly,
immaterial in determining where interstate commerce ends. East
Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission, 283 U.S. 465 (1930); National
Labor Relations Bd. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1937).
7. Principal case at 877, 878. On the difficulties inherent in the
conjunctive test see dissent by Justice Black, principal case at
889. Cf. termination of interstate commerce under a test of "the
purpose for which it was imported." General R. Signal Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 246 U.S. 500 (1917).
8. Principal case at 888. Justices Black, Rutiedge dissenting; Jus-
tices Douglas and Murphy joining in the dissent on this point.
The suggested test would apply the rule in Brown v. Houston,
114 U.S. 622 (1885), to foreign imports.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions purport to be
grounded on the rule in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U.S.
1827). See principal case, Justice Stone at 878; Justice Black at
887-888. It is to be noted that further support for Justice Black's
contention that his dissent is in accord with Brown v. Maryland
supra found that case at 446; "Sale is the object of importation, and
is an essential ingredient of that intercourse of which importation
constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable
19451
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U.S. Const. Art. 1 § 10, cl. 2 provides that "No state shall,
without consent of Congress, 9 lay any imposts or duties10 on imports
or exports," except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection laws.112 So long as articles retain their "character as
imports, a tax upon them, in any shape, is within the constitutional
to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importation itself."
See also id. at 448. It is suggested that the emphasis throughout
Justice Marshall's opinion is not upon whether the goods were
in the original package, nor yet whether they had lost their dis-
tinctive character as imports, but whether an act had occurred on
the part of the importer by which "it has become incorporated
and mixed up with the mass of the property in the country." Id.
at 441. Importations were made for the sake of the sale, but
the importer might instead keep the article for his own use. The
immunity did not continue after the intent to use became manifest.
Breaking the package was evidence of the intent to convert to his
own use; use by the importer was an alternate evidence that the
protected privilege of sale was not going to be exercised. The
"character as an import" as the determining factor was apparently
developed by Justice Field in Low. v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29, 34
(U.S. 1871) and Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (U.S. 1875). Cf.
Kallenbach, "Federal Cooperation with the States Under the Com-
merce Clause" (1942) 52-60; Sharp, "Movement in Supreme Court
Adjudication-A Study of Modified and Overruled Decisions" (1933)
46 Harv. L. Rev. 593, esp. 604-610.
9. Madison moved to make the prohibition absolute on the ground
that if " . . . the States interested in this power by which they
could tax imports of their neighbors passing thro' their markets,
were a majority, could get consent," it "would revive all the mis-
chiefs experienced from the want of a General government over
commerce." Documents of the Formation of the Union of the
American States, H.R.Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927)
629-631. Also, Warren, "The Making of the Constitution" (1928)
557-559.
Congressional consent never expressly given. See De Bary
and Co. v. Louisiana, 227 U.S. 108 (1913) (consent to impose
license tax on dealers selling imported wines implied from the
Webb-Kenyon Act).
10. "In the Constitutional Convention, there was question of the
meanings of 'duties,' 'imports'. and 'excises'." The question was
not answered. Norton, "The Constitution of the United States:
Its Sources and Its Application" (6th ed. 1943) 43-47.
Duties, imposts, and excises have in the constitution been used
in antithesis to direct taxes. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 and § 9,
cl. 4. All property taxes are at present held to be direct taxes.
Pollock v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 157 U.S. 601 (1895). See note
13 infra.
11. Justice Marshall "supposed the principles . . . to apply equally
to importations from a sister State." Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 419, 441 (U.S. 1827). Overruled in Woodruff v. Parham,
8 Wall. 123 (U.S. 1868) inapplicable to imports from another state).
12. 28 Am. Jur. 850, "Inspection Laws" § 2. Invalid where fee im-
posed is excessive. D. E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494
(1914). Whether charge is excessive is a Congressional ques-
tion. Neilson v. Garza, 17 Fed. Cas. 1302 No. 10,091 (E.D. Tex.
1876), approved Patopsio Guano Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of
Agriculture, 171 U.S. 345 (1898).
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prohibition."13 Thus, the original package doctrine' 4 was developed
as a test of the "point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the
power of the state to tax commences.' 15 Early decisions restricted
the doctrine to foreign commerce and the imports-and-exports clause,16
after developing the relation of the commerce clause to state taxation,' 7
the Court extended the doctrine to interstate commerce.' 8
The application of the original package rule under the imports-
and-exports clause and the commerce clause is not uniform.'0 Sub-
stantially, two rules exist: both operate to render invalid state tax-
ation of the privilege of selling imported goods while they are in
the hands of the importer and in the original packages. 29 Under the
13. Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29, 34 (U.S. 1871); Willicuts v. Bunn,
282 U.S. 216 (1930), 71 A.L.R. 1260, 1268 (1931) E.g.: Property
tax on article, Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1880). License
tax on importer, Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama,
288 U.S. 218 (1933); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U.S.
1827). Occupation tax on auctioneer measured by commissions
on sales of imports, Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 (1878).
Stamp tax on bill of lading for goods, see Almy v. California, 24
How. 169, 174 (U.S. 1860). Fine for unlawful possession, People
v. Buffalo Fish Co., Ltd., 62 N.Y.S. 543 (1899), 164 N.Y. 93, 58
N.E. 34 (1900).
14. Original packages consist of the boxes, cases, or bales in which
the goods are shipped and not the smaller packages therein con-
tained. May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900); Mexican Pe-
troleum Corp. v. South Portland, 121 Me. 128, 115 Atl. 900 (1922),
26 A.L.R. 965, 971 (1923).
"According to the celebrated original package doctrine . . .
importation is not over so long as the goods are in the original
package. Hence, a state has no power to tax mports until the
original package is broken or there has been olne sale while thegoods are still in the original package." Willis, "ConstitutionalLaw of the United States" (1936) 268-269. See statement of
the rule in Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29, at 34 (U.S. 1871). Or
one sale, introduced in Watring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall. 110 (U.S.(1868).
15. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, at 441 (U.S. 1827). Marshall
insisted that the prohibitory clauses had reference to taxing power
of states and not to their power to regulate commerce. Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, at 198 (U.S. 1824). Willis, "Gibbons v.
Ogden, Then and Now" (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 280. Both the com-
merce clause and the imports-and-exports clause determined the
decision in Brown v. Maryland, supra at 448.
16. Woodruff v. Parham, & Wall. 123 (U.S. 1868). Note 11 supra.
17. License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U.S. 1847); Woodruff v. Parham, 8
Wall 123 (U.S. 1868); Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148 (U.S. 1868).
It is suggested that the holding in Woodruff v. Parham, supra in
so far as it overruled Marshall's definition of imports, began the
divergence in the original-package rules between interstate and
foreign commerce.
18. Austin v. Tenn., 179 U.S. 343 (1900); Leisy and Co. v. Hardin,
135 U.S. 100 (1890). For the relation of the extension to the
development of the police power of the states see Grant, "State
Power to Prohibit Interstate Commerce" (1937) 26 Calif. L. Rev. 34.
19. Dowling and Hubbard, "Divesting an Article of Its Interstate
Character" (1921) 5 Minn. L. Rev. 100, 253. Eg. property, use,
1945]
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commerce clause state property taxation of goods imported from
another state is valid, if the goods have reached their destination or
are at rest, whether in the original package or not, unless the tax
discriminates against the goods solely because of their origin or
otherwise burdens interstate commerce. 21 Under the imports-and-ex-
ports clause not even a property tax can be levied on goods imported
from outside the country so long as they remain in the original pack-
ages and are in the hands of the importer. 22 Even under the imports-
and-exports clause, the original package doctrine obviously is inap-
plicable to certain kinds of property.2 3 In such cases, the determining
factor in deciding whether the property has lost its status as an im-
port appears to be "whether it has become mingled with other prop-
erty in the state."24
The difference has been rationalized as the resultant of an ab-
solute tax prohibition as opposed to a prohibition against regulation
effected through taxation.25 The dissenting opinion, by implication,
construes the imports-and-exports clause as another recurrence to the
national prerogative to regulate foreign commerce contained in the
commerce clause. 26 Accordingly, a substantive test for the termina-
and sales taxes. Brown, "Federal and State Taxation" (1933) 81
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 247.
20. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1932), 85 A.L.R. 699,
735 (1933) (interstate); Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v.
Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933) (foreign).
22. Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885); Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 294 U.S. 169 (1934); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport,
289 U.S. 249 (1932). The fact that a state tax is nondiscrimina-
tory and general in its operation does not save it from being
declared invalid if it directly burdens interstate commerce. See
J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 117 A.L.R. 429,
444 (1938).
22. May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900).
23. E.g. timber, cattle, oil, gas. Trickett, "'The Original Package
Ineptitude" (1917) 22 Dick L. Rev. 63; Foster, "What is Left of
the Original Package Doctrine?" (1916) 1 So. L. Q. 303.
24. Cf. Marshall's test cited supra note 8. Tres Titos Ranch Co. v.
Abbott, 44 N. M. 556, 105 P(2d) 1070 (1940), 130 A.L.R. 963,
969 (1941).
25. "The distinction is that the immunity attaches to the import
itself before sale, while the immunity in case of an article, because
of its relation to interstate commerce depends on the question
whether the tax challenged regulates or burdens interstate com-
merce." Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, at 508 (1922);
American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U.S. 500 (1903); Bald-
win v. G. A. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935), 101 A.L.R. 55, 64 (1936).
Cf. Marshall's position, supra note 15. The act of laying and
collecting taxes, duties, imposts and excise is an exercise of the
taxing power and not of the power to regulate commerce. Cox
v. Lott (State Tonnage Tax Cases), 12 Wall. 204 (U.S. 1870). It
is submitted that this identification with the taxing power is the
result of the struggle to harmonize the commerce clause and the
taxing power. See arguments of cases cited supra note 16.
26. Principal case at 888. Cf: "The power is buttressed by the ex-
press provision of the Constitution denying the States authority
to lay imposts and duties on imports and exports." University
324 [Vol. 20
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tion of the tax immunity would consider the effect of the tax upon
foreign conmnerce 27 rather than an immunity intrinsic to an article
because of its form as an original package. The reason for two orig-
inal package rules ceases to exist.
A novel feature of the instant decision is the recognition of the
immunity of an import for manufacture in the hands of the ultimate
consumer.28 The rule was laid down in relation to imports for sale,29
justified on the theory that the person who paid the duties purchased
a tax-immune privilege to sell. 0  It was not intended that the im-
porter who brought in goods "for his own use" should thereby be
enabled to "retain much valuable property exempt rom taxation."31
Since 1827, the purpose of importation has changed as a concomitant
of the shift from an agricultural to an industrial society. 2 Present
business practices leave the bulk of imports in the hands of importers
of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, at 56 (1 32); " . . . the
taxing power is a distinct power; that . . . is distinct from the
power to regulate commerce." Id. at 58; " . . . the judicial
department may not attempt in its own conception of policy to
distribute the duties thus fixed by allocating some of them to
the exercise of the admitted power to regulate commerce and
others to an independent exercise of the taxing power." Id. at
58. See also, Abel, "The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional
Convention and in Contemporary Comment" (1941) 25 Minn. L.
Rev. 432; Gavit, "The Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution" (1932) Appendix A; Kallenbach, op. ct. supra note
8, 377; and supra note 9.
27. E.g. "whether the tax challenged regulates or burdens (foreign)
commerce." See again note 25 supra.
The majority opinion professes concern for "matters of sub-
stance not of form" and recognizes that the "extent of . . . im-
munity from state taxation turns on the essential nature of the
transaction; considered in the light of the constitutional purpose,
and not on . . . formalities . . . " Principal case at 876. See,
however, the basis given for regarding the presence of original
wrappings as substance rather than form. Id. 877.
27. See principal case, Stone at 875-876; Black at 8&7-888. It is ob-
viously impossible to determine to what extent tax assessors have
treated the two types of imports uniformly. The practice which
has prevailed will determine the immediate effeet of the instant
decision.
29. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, at 441 (U.S. 1827).
30. Id. at 443; Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29 (U.S. 1871); Coe v. Errol,
116 U.S. 517 (1885).
31. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, at 422 (U.S. 1827). See note
7 supra.
32. In 1830, 72.4% of the imports were manufactured articles; In
1940, 72.9% of the total imports were crudes or semi-manufactures.
Figures based on Table 588, "Statistical Ahstract of U.S." H.R.
Doc. No. 411, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. (1941) 533. For comparable
changes in value of imports, see id. Tables 569, 589. It is of
interest that imports for manufacture totalling $1,853,513,000, in
1939, constituted only 5% in value of the raw materials used in
manufacturing. Figures based on Census reports of Chief Ameri-




for manufacture.33 The original justification for the rule was based
on a consideration of the commercial nature of the transaction and
the effect of the tax upon commerce. 34 The justification is, however,
not logically applicable to imports for manufacture. The dissenting
opinion repudiates the extension.3 5 It is submitted that an extension
in this case is to make the test of an original package "an ultimate
principle36 and that the balancing of the interest of the states in
revenue37 with the tax immunity granted under the imports-and-ex-
ports clause is best achieved by resort to a substantive rather than to
a formal test for the duration of the immunity.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STATE REGULATION AND ENCLAVED FEDERAL TERRITORY
Army officers on a military reservation within the boundaries of a
dry state forwarded orders for liquor through a club secretary to an
outstate dealer. While in transit by common carrier under a uniform
bill of lading, the shipment was seized by state officers for confiscation
and destruction under the Oklahoma Permit Law.1  A state law made
33. E.g. less than 1/10 of 1% of the Hooven & Allison Co. purchases
of imports were spot purchases. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, Tax
Commr., 142 Ohio St. 235, 237 (1943).
34. See arguments developed in cases cited note 30 supra. Notice
the preservation of protection for the privilege of selling as re-
tained in the commerce -clause under other tests. See citations
note 10 supra.
35. Principal case at 888.
36. Cf. " . . . the test of the original package is not an ultimate
principle. It is an illustration of a principle . . . What is ulti-
mate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another
may not place itself in a position of economic isolation." Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, at 526-527 (1935) (interstate com-
merce).
37. The total revenue from real and personal property taxes in 1941
was 4 billion, 5 million; the states' share being 250 million and
the remainder going to political subdivisions. "Statistical Abstract
for 1943" (1943) 282. Estimated at an average of state ad valorem
tax rates of 6 mills to the dollar, $15,263,936 taxes would have
accrued to the states in 1940 had the rule been enforced in accord
with the minority opinion.
A possible solution of the definition of the termination of
the immunity of an import lies in legislation along the line of
the Wisconsin exemption of "merchandise placed in storage in
original package in a commercial storage warehouse or public
wharf." Wis. State (1943) tit. X, c. 70 § 11(37). See also C.C.H.
"State Tax Guide Service" (1941) 52-000.
1. Okla. Stat. Ann. (1941) tit. 37§ 41-48.
Amendment XXI, § 2, gives a dry state the power to forbid
all importation of intoxicating liquor into the state or to adopt
a lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition. State Board
of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936); Ma-
honey v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304, U.S. 401 (1937). A state
may also require a permit for the transportation of intoxi-
cants in interstate commerce through the state as a means of
establishing the identity of transporters, their routes and points
of destination and of enabling local officers to take appropriate
[Vol. 20
